Kirk Report
Ending Somali Piracy Against American and Allied Shipping

Overview

With pirates now holding two dozen major ships and hundreds of crew held hostage, their multi-million dollar ransoms have become a major source of funding for Somali Al Qaeda affiliates running the largest terror training camps on earth. Unless our policy becomes more aggressive to attack pirates, we will see a huge increase in terrorism from Al Qaeda affiliates that feed off pirate ransoms.

Executive Summary

While the end of Bin Laden was a victory for counter-terrorism, piracy in the Indian Ocean represents a growing danger to the American economy and national security.

In the last four years, pirates expanded their range across the Indian Ocean to the coast of Sri Lanka. They now attack ships at the entrances to the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, where 30,000 ships -- including 70 percent of the world's petroleum traffic -- must pass. The total cost of piracy, including ransoms, insurance, naval forces, imprisonment and diversions now totals up to $12 billion annually.

Over the last three years, the number of Somali pirate attacks against American and allied shipping increased 309%. There are currently 23 ships in pirate hands with 483 western and allied sailors held hostage. From 2008-2010, shippers paid over $178 million in pirate ransoms -- the average pirate ransom increased 36 times, from $1.3 million to $5.4 million per ship. Each pirate now earns an average of $80,000 per ship. The number of pirates operating in Somalia grew from less than 100 in 2005 to more than 2,000 in 2011.

Pirates show no reluctance to attack American ships, including the M/V Maersk Alabama and S/V Quest, where pirates murdered four Americans on board. Pirates also succeeded in attacking large oil tankers bound for the United States, most recently the M/T Irene, released in April 2011, after a record $11 million ransom.
The United States and allied navies deploy task forces of more than twenty warships to the area, as well as the Chinese, Russian and Indian navies that operate independently. While naval forces had limited success, many routinely allow pirates to pass or quickly release them without delay or punishment. The Kenyan government now estimates that roughly 30% of ransoms -- totaling more than $50 million -- are funneled to the East African Al Qaeda/Al Shabaab Islamic terrorist groups that run the largest terror training camps in the world.

Piracy has been met by strong action in the past. When President Jefferson ended federal pirate payments and attacked pirate forces in 1801, he announced the arrival of the United States as an international power. The mission he gave founded the U.S. Navy. During the Ming Dynasty in 1433, China deployed naval forces to the Indian Ocean to defend its ships against Somali pirates.

Today, however, American and allied policy has failed to defeat piracy and the pirates have the upper hand. Somali pirates now operate across Persian Gulf supply lines, critical to American and allied energy needs. This report argues that the United States can fix this problem, lowering costs to the U.S. economy and restoring the security of America’s gasoline supplies.

Proposed Solutions

In the face of rising numbers of pirate hostages and ransoms, the current international policy against Somali piracy has failed. The U.S. and international community should change its current policies to include:

- **A US/UN ban on ransom payments** that support the expansion of pirate operations and support for East African Al Qaeda/Al Shabaab terror;
- **Aggressive Rules of Engagement** giving authority for local naval commanders to attack and disable pirate “motherships,” leaving them adrift to empower on-scene commanders with the tactical authority to arrest pirates and rescue crews;
- **Economic Assistance** to reward Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Somaliland, Puntland, Ahlusunna Wal-jamea (ASWJ) and Jubaland frontline communities who confront or convert Al Shabaab or pirate-controlled areas;
Judicial Assistance to Puntland and Kenya to expand their courts and prisons to readily accept pirates captured by international or Somali allied military/law enforcement forces;

Military Assistance to TFG, Puntland, Somaliland, ASWJ or Jubaland forces who gain control of Al Shabaab or pirate-controlled areas; and,

A Blockade of the three primary pirate ports and shorelines, including the El Danaan Anchorage, where 12 western tankers/merchant ships with 290 hostages are held.

These and other policies outlined in the detailed report would rapidly end a growing threat to U.S. national security and an increased source of funding for terrorism.

Detailed Report

Logistics

Senator Mark Kirk (R-IL) led a six-person delegation to Bahrain, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya April 25-May 2, 2011. The members included Dennis Balkham (Appropriations Staff), Patrick Magnuson (Kirk Staff), LTC Michael O'Brien (USSOCOM), CDR Brian Lindoerfer (US Navy) and LT Christina Trumpikas (NAVCENT). The delegation met with U.S. embassies, host country governments, the US Fifth Fleet, crews of the USS Stephen W. Groves (FFG 29) and Chinese PLAN Wenzhou (DDG 526) and interviewed pirates incarcerated in Bosasso (Somalia) and Mombasa (Kenya).

Background

The government of Somalia collapsed in 1991 and has not been replaced. Somalia is divided between various quasi-states, foreign-backed armies, a UN-supported transitional government and local clans. Piracy off the coast of Somalia began in 2005 with a few fishermen learning that the fishing vessels of other countries could be held for ransom.

Piracy became a big business in 2008 when pirates extorted their first regular flow of million-dollar ransoms:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attacks</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hijackings</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>309%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Ransom</td>
<td>$1.3m</td>
<td>$5.4m</td>
<td>269%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Days Held</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>216%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Anti-Piracy Naval Forces

In response, the international community deployed several overlapping naval task forces to fight piracy, including:

Task Force 151: Ships from nine countries, including the US, Australia, UK, Pakistan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Turkey and Singapore. This force currently has four ships.

Task Force 508: Ships from NATO countries, including the US, Turkey, Denmark and the Netherlands. This force currently has five ships.

Task Force 465: Ships from EU countries, including France, Finland, Spain, Germany, Italy and Portugal. This force currently has 6 ships.

Independent Forces: Ships also protect their own flag and other shipping from China (TF 526), India, Indonesia, South Korea, Japan and Russia. They currently deploy 11 ships.

In the case of China, her commitment of naval forces is historic. In January of 2009, a Chinese naval task force arrived on station in the Gulf of Aden to conduct counter-piracy operations. In the two years since, 20 Chinese warships rotated through the area, successfully escorting more than 3,000 merchant ships along a 590-nautical mile corridor. The Chinese Task Force also includes Special Operations teams that serve as embarked security on Chinese flagged merchant vessels. Initially deployed to protect Chinese merchant ships, the Task Force is escorting a growing number of international vessels, including three U.S. flagged ships so far this year. This is the first major deployment of the Chinese navy to this area since 1433.

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

Nearly all naval ships deployed have Rules of Engagement (ROE) that permit the use of force to defend their own ships. Most naval ships may use force to help the ships of their own country to defend against a current attack until the pirates take control. Once pirates seize the crew, most
nations will not engage pirates and will allow them to move the ship to the Somali coast, where the crew and ship are ransomed. Once part of the crew is in Somalia, pirates often use the captured ship as a long-range "mothership" to return to sea, towing skiffs that are used to attack new ships. Since some of the “mothership” crews are hostages, most navies will not attack.

EU navies have some of the weakest ROE and their shippers pay the highest ransoms. Even when their navies manage to capture pirates, they usually release pirates rather than prosecute them in their own countries, or deliver them to Puntland or Kenya for regional incarceration.

The United States, Britain, South Korea, UAE and France will attack pirates who have control of their flagged ships even after pirates have taken hostages. The United States will attack the skiffs of “motherships” to deny the faster boats needed by a “mothership” to attack a ship. Only the Indian and Russian navies regularly attack and use lethal force in nearly all pirate encounters. There are reports that every Somali who has boarded a Russian ship has not survived the encounter.

While the successes of the naval ships deployed are limited, there have been some notable battles against pirates, including the recaptures of:

- **M/V Maersk Alabama** by the USS Bainbridge (April 12, 2009)
- **M/V Magellan Star** by the USS Dubuque/15th MEU (September 9, 2010)
- **M/V Taipan** by the Dutch HNLMS Tromp (April 10, 2010)
- **M/T Moscow University** by the Russian ADM Shaposnikov (May 6, 2010)

**The Current Size of the Problem**

There are currently 23 vessels and 483 hostages imprisoned under Somali pirate control (M/V = large merchant vessel, M/T = large tanker, F/V = fishing vessel, S/V = sailing vessel):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Somali Anchorage/Ship Name</th>
<th>Date of Seizure</th>
<th>Hostages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huridyo - 41 Hostages total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/V Doust (Panama)</td>
<td>28 Feb 2011</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/V ING (Netherlands)</td>
<td>24 Feb 2011</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
M/V Susan K (Antigua & Barbuda)  8 April 2010  10

**Camp July, Garacad - 10 Hostages total**  
*Darood Clan Control*

Olib G (Malta)  8 Sep 2010  10

**El Danaan - 290 Hostages total**  
*Hawiye Clan Control*

M/T Zirku (UAE)  28 Mar 2011  29
M/V Khaled Muhieddine (Togo)  20 Jan 2011  25
M/V Eagle (Cyprus)  17 Jan 2011  24
M/V Bilda (Alegeria)  1 Jan 2011  27
F/V Jill Chun Tsai 68 (Taiwan)  20 Mar 2010  14
M/V Yuan Xian (Panama)  12 Nov 2010  29
M/V Sinn (Malta)  12 Feb 2011  23
M/V Hoang Son Sun (Thailand)  18 Jan 2011  24
M/V Suez (Panama)  2 Aug 2010  24
M/V Iceberg  29 Mar 2010  24
F/V Prantalay (Thailand)  18 Apr 2010  25
M/V Rosalia D'Amato (Italy)  21 April 2011  22

**Canuu - 50 hostages total**

M/T Polar (Panama)  30 Oct 2010  24
F/V Shiuh Fu 1 (Taiwan)  25 Dec 2010  26

**Haradheere - 88 hostages total**

M/V Albedo (Malaysia)  25 Nov 2010  24
M/T MSC Panama (Liberia)  10 Dec 2010  23
M/V Orna (Panama)  20 Dec 2010  19
M/T Savina Caylyn (Italy)  8 Feb 2011  22

**Undetermined anchorage - 25 hostages**

M/V Gemini (Singapore)  30 Apr 2011  25

Of the current 483 hostages held by pirates, 221 have been imprisoned since last year.
Clans Backing Piracy

Darood (aka Darod, Daroud)
The Darood clan lives principally in the north, with a presence in Kismayo, as well as in the Gedo region. The Darood are commonly divided into three major groups: Ogaden, Marehan, and Harti. The Harti are composed of the Majerteen, now found primarily in Puntland, and the Dulbahante and Warsangeli in Somaliland. The Marehan are dominant in south-central Gedo region, while the Ogaden can be found in southern Somalia as well as in Ethiopia and Kenya. Since the Darood are present in the north, in south-central Somalia as well as inside Ethiopia, and Kenya, they are broadly considered the most prominent advocates of pan-Somali nationalists. Many Somalis blamed Siad Barre, Somalia's last national president, for favoring members of his Marehan sub-clan, which spurred the Daroods in northeastern Somalia, who felt marginalized, to rise up against his government, followed by Dir, from what is now Somaliland. Much of the current Darood-Hawiye mistrust is considered to stem from Barre's rule.

Hawiye

The Hawiye can be found in central and southern Somalia and are considered the dominant clan in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. The two major Hawiye subdivisions are the Habar Gedir and the Abgal. Hawiye dissatisfaction is considered to have played a major role in the travails of the interim government since its inception in late 2004. That dissatisfaction helped fuel the Islamist movement that controlled Mogadishu for the latter half of 2006, until its defeat by Ethiopia and Somalia. Some Hawiye are still considered to be involved in the current insurgency.

Pirate Leaders

As piracy becomes more lucrative, a handful of pirate leaders are amassing powerful militias. These pirate kingpins command sophisticated networks, are adopting military structures and are gaining stature among international leaders. They now operate as cartels with investors, pick-up crews and partnership-paid crews with bonuses. Three of the most prominent pirate kingpins are:

Mohamed Hassan Abdi “Afweyne”
(Hawiye Clan) --

Somali pirate Omar Baqalyo, Bosasso Prison, Puntland.

Overflying hostages at anchor: Senator Kirk with LTJG Alyssa Wilson (Plainfield, IL) of VP-5 (U.S. Navy monitoring in background) Courtesy of U.S. Navy
Founder of the central Somalia pirate network, Afweyne—meaning “big mouth” in Somali—is responsible for at least 20 hijackings, including *M/V Sirius Star* and *M/V Faina*. His network is reported to have a highly organized, military structure, and operates from the ports of Hobyo and Harardheere. Afweyne’s son, Abdiqaadir, is assuming a larger role in leading the piracy operations. Afweyne drew international attention when he was a guest of Muammar Qadafi at a 2009 celebration in Tripoli. A few weeks after the celebration, Qadafi publicly defended the piracy in a speech to the UN General Assembly.

**Mohamed Abdi “Garaad” (Darood Clan)** –
In command of one of the largest pirate militias, Garaad is outspoken and well known to the international media. He is reported to command 13 separate militia groups, totaling over 800 pirates. In a 2009 interview, he proclaimed, “The navies, they can’t stop us … we have more than 200 crews and we are increasing all the time.” Garaad is responsible for the attack on *M/V Maersk Alabama*, which ended with the successful operation by US Navy SEALs. After this operation, Garaad publicly threatened to retaliate against US ships and crews. Garaad is also responsible for the 2009 attack on the *M/V Sea Horse*, a ship delivering World Food Program aid to Somalia.

**Abshir Abdillai “Boyah” (Darood Clan)** –
The delegation met Boyah in the Bosasso Prison. The 44-year-old former fisherman boasts he hijacked more than 60 vessels, and the UN reports he is responsible for at least 25. Before his incarceration, he commanded a pirate militia of more than 500. In a 2008 interview, Boyah noted, “We give priority to ships from Europe because we get bigger ransoms.” This strategy netted Boyah’s network $2 million when he seized the French yacht *Le Ponant* in 2008. Boyah was confident and brash when he met with the delegation, taking time to pose for pictures, proclaiming his innocence, and bragging about his role in the “reformed pirate” movement. When asked who the most dangerous pirate is, he deadpanned, “Who do you think?”

**Forces Inside Somalia**

The delegation repeatedly heard that 'piracy cannot be solved at sea -- it must be solved on land.' The are a multitude of forces who support, oppose or are neutral toward piracy:
The Pirates (est. 2,000): Somali-based pirates are organized based on clan structure, with no single strategy or chain of command. This independent and decentralized structure makes pirate organizations extremely difficult to dismantle. Reports suggest that there are approximately 10 of these organizations with complex financing and operational frameworks. Pirate stock markets are functioning where pirate groups seek investors to bankroll their operations in exchange for a cut of the ransom. Additionally, pirate networks are starting to adopt a military organizational structure to improve their efficiency. In fact, the pirates are becoming more efficient, and have extended their range to more than 1,500 nautical miles from the Somali coast. In short, pirates are more efficient and have greater access to finances than ever before.

Al Shabaab (8,000): Al Shababb is an Islamic militant organization that controls much of southern Somalia, including portions of the capital, Mogadishu. Founded in 2006, it was part of the Islamic Courts Union – the organization that ruled Somalia until Ethiopian forces entered the country and helped install the Transitional Federal Government. Al-Shabaab leaders have publicly claimed to be affiliated with al-Qaeda and the group was designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States in 2008.

Al-Shabaab’s forces are estimated to be roughly 8,000 – with the ability to field greater numbers as necessary. Between 200 and 300 foreign fighters are estimated to belong to al-Shabaab, some of whom come from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. Their tactics include suicide attacks, improvised explosive devices, kidnapping and targeted assassination.

Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (8,000): The TFG is the most recent in a series of 14 attempts to create a functioning government in Somalia since the end of Muhammad Siad Barre’s dictatorial rule in 1991. The TFG was initially hosted in Kenya, and first convened in Somalia in February 2006. Due to the tribal and warlord-driven political landscape of Somalia, the TFG has integrated a host of self-interested members into its ranks. As a result, almost no political progress has materialized in Somalia.

The TFG does not possess a capable military body and is highly dependent on the African Union’s forces to project power over the 60-70% of Mogadishu it controls.
AU AMISOM (8,000): After the fall of the Islamic Courts Union in 2006, the African Union, in conjunction with the UN, agreed to send a temporary peacekeeping force to Mogadishu. Despite pledges from five African nations, only Burundi and Uganda have actually participated in the AMISOM mission. AMISOM currently has approximately 8,000 peacekeeping soldiers on the ground in Mogadishu. Djibouti and Guinea agreed to send troops to join AMISOM in 2010, however those forces are yet to arrive. The African Union is debating whether to expand the mandate of AMISOM to allow for more offensive operations against al-Shabaab.

Somaliland (16,000): Somaliland, the northwestern portion of Somalia, is a functioning, semi-autonomous region that has held several democratic elections since 1991. This stability has allowed Somaliland to become relatively prosperous, and this prosperity has led to a powerful secessionist movement. Although the region declared its independence in 1991, it is not recognized by any nations in the international community. Somaliland maintains a 600-strong coast guard that patrols its territorial waters for pirates and illegal fishing. Earlier this year, a new prison opened in Hargeisa with significant assistance and financing from the UN. This facility currently holds more than 70 suspected pirates awaiting trial, and could be a model for additional Somali-based prisons and courts to handle piracy cases.

Puntland (5,000): Puntland is a self-declared, semi-autonomous region in northern Somalia. The
absence of significant military or coast guard forces has allowed pirates to set up enclaves and hubs for operations across its coastline. The Puntland government expresses a desire to fight al-Shabaab, piracy, and crime, but lacks significant resources. Puntland government forces successfully removed pirates from the port city of Eyl, and recently turned back an al-Shabaab offensive in the mountains south of Bosasso. These security forces vary greatly in their training and abilities, and the government has no maritime resources to patrol its waters.

Puntland currently holds roughly 350 pirates in its prisons, most of them in Bosasso. This prison also houses one of the three Somali pirate kingpins, “Boyah.”

**ASWJ (6,000):** The ASWJ is a political, social, and militant group aligned with TFG and Ethiopian forces. They support Ethiopian operations against al-Shabaab, and find their support in Somalia’s Sufi population. The ASWJ has approximately 4,500 fighters.

The TFG and ASWJ signed an agreement on March 15, 2010, that gave the militia control of certain ministries, diplomatic posts and other key positions.

**Jubaland (2,000):** Founded on April 3, 2011, Jubaland is the newest self-declared state within Somalia. It is led by a former Somali defense minister, Mohamed Abdi Gandhi.

Supported by Kenya, Jubaland is intended to serve as a buffer state between war-torn central Somalia, al-Shabaab, and the Kenyan border. Kenya is providing military assistance to Jubaland, but the military offensive has not proven effective.

**Prisons Holding Pirates**

The delegation learned that approximately 740 suspected and convicted Somali pirates are currently being held in 13 countries and territories. Among others, U.S. authorities hold approximately 26. A total of six have been sentenced, with the remainder awaiting trial on a variety of piracy-related charges. Kenya currently holds 122 piracy suspects with 50 convicted and sentenced in 2009 and 2010. Forty-seven pirates are detained in the Seychelles, where 22 convictions have been secured. In addition, approximately 350 pirates are currently held in the Puntland region of Somalia. The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) recently completed the construction of a 462-inmate prison in Hargeisa in Somaliland, and currently is in discussions with Mauritius regarding the construction of a 60-inmate prison there.
The lack of prison capacity is the single largest obstacle to the trial of pirates by states in the region. Prison terms for piracy can be quite lengthy and regional States fear being left with the expensive legacy of caring for long-term prisoners after the problem of piracy is solved.

Proposals for US Economic, Judicial and Military Assistance

Economic—while substantial—is not targeted against terror and piracy. Aid programs should be used to reward front-line communities who confront or convert pirate or Al Shabbad communities

Somaliland: USAID’s estimated FY2010 contribution to Somaliland is approximately $46.8 million, covering Humanitarian ($20.6 million) and Development ($26.2 million) Assistance. USAID’s Humanitarian Assistance efforts include an array of activities focused on economic recovery, market systems, agriculture, food security, protection, water and sanitation. The program provides food assistance for more than 18,650 countrywide. Development Assistance funds include activities aimed at improving security and strengthening good governance at the grass roots through education, conflict mitigation and other basic social services.

Puntland: USAID’s estimated FY2010 contribution to Puntland is $16.4 million for programs similar to those in Somaliland. USAID’s food assistance program provided an estimated 5,000 metric tons in 2010. USAID plans on expanding Development Assistance programs in 2011.

TFG: USAID has provided approximately $9.25 million in direct aid to the TFG. This does not include funding for military missions and the AMISOM mission.

The European Union recently stated that future funding to the TFG is in jeopardy if the TFG unilaterally extends its governing mandate without democratic elections. The EU’s plans provide for $384 million in funding by 2013.

Judicial Aid should be employed to expand prisons and courts handling pirates

Pirates continue to be tried and convicted throughout the region and in the United States, although the number of convictions pale in comparison to the scale of the problem. To date, 50 pirates have been convicted in Kenya, 22 in the Seychelles, and six in the United States. While Kenya, the Seychelles and Somalia receive some prosecutorial and court-system support from the UNODC, Kenya in particular has expressed concern that it is carrying a heavier burden than others in the region and is not receiving the financial, technical and physical support that it requires from the United States and others in the international community.
Military Aid

**Puntland:** In late 2010, unidentified foreign donors financed a program to recruit and train a counter-piracy force for Puntland. After allegations that this force violated the UN arms embargo, it was put on hold indefinitely. If the UN decides to support the formation of this force, it could be reconstituted and running by the end of 2011.

**TFG:** A variety of actors have provided both sanctioned and non-sanctioned support to the TFG. Djibouti, France, Italy, the UK, and US have provided training, supplies, funding and light arms and ammunition to TFG. This assistance is provided through direct out-of-country training, third-party country transfers of military equipment or the use of private contractors in the country. Non-sanctioned parties include Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates. This assistance has taken the form of training for officers, protective details and other capabilities.

Despite these efforts, serious concerns remain surrounding the effectiveness and long-term impact of this assistance. According to a 2010 UN report, desertion rates among TFG soldiers is 80% and soldiers are known to sell their ammunition. Training also is politicized, with clans seeking to influence who receives the highly coveted foreign training.

**ASWJ:** The Ethiopian government and ASWJ leadership freely admit that Ethiopia provides training to ASWJ fighters. The specific nature of this training is unclear.

**Jubaland:** Kenya has been one of the region’s largest proponents of establishing an autonomous state and buffer zone in the Juba Valley. Reports suggest that 2,500 Somali youth from the Juba Valley and Dadaab Refugee Camp have been trained by the Kenyan government.

**Shipping Policy**
The US/UN should specifically authorize all merchant ships in the Indian Ocean to carry arms and allow security teams and authorize citadels to secure crews awaiting rescue. To date, armed crews and security teams have defeated all pirate attacks.
Summary
On September 28, 2010, pirates attacked M/V Asphalt Venture just southeast of the Tanzania coast. The ship was ultimately released after a $3.5-million ransom was paid, and eight of its crew returned home to India. The twist in the story is that the M/V Asphalt Venture had a crew of 15, and the remaining seven are still held hostage by the pirates, who are now demanding the release of 100 pirates captured by Indian naval forces.

Until now, pirate hijackings followed a predictable pattern that usually ended with a hefty ransom paid, and the ship and its crew released relatively unharmed. Pirates are no longer satisfied with ransoms, and this delicate balance has been disrupted, resulting in escalation by the pirates.

The growing threat demands a new strategy from the United States that aggressively defeats pirates at sea in the tradition of the Jefferson Administration and its successful policy. With pirates now attacking tankers across America’s oil-supply lines, it is clear that current policies have failed.

Senator Kirk wishes to thank VP-5, CJTF-HOA and the State Department / USAID for their efforts against the growing threat of piracy.